

Word available the last fatal week—word most needed at Pearl Harbor—never was sent.

Obviously the President, "as the sands run out" at Pearl Harbor, was definitely expecting a Japanese attack.

But the nearer it was expected the more careful he became that when the attack should come, it should be such as the isolationists could not tie onto himself.

The attack, which came at Pearl Harbor Dec. 7, was one which the "isolationists" could not tie onto the President.

But the success of the attack can in part, in all fairness, and in such measure as each citizen shall judge, be placed at the door of the Commander-in-Chief as commander and personally.

The President, and others, in Washington, first had lulled the commanders at Pearl Harbor into expecting only—sabotage.

The President too had given them such restraining precautions and orders they did not know what they could or dare do—in measures of protection and defense.

The Japanese, as Davis and Lindsay had said, solved the problem of how to summon the nation against isolationism for the President at Pearl Harbor.

But in trying to keep "the record clear," the President unknowingly and unintentionally had contributed to the destruction of the Pacific battle fleet, had helped to bring about Russian and Corregidor, had lengthened immeasurably the Japanese war.

#### WHY?

This of course explains many things.

It explains the long delay of the court-martial of General Short and Admiral Kimmel.

It explains why the President through members of Senate and House, stopped Congress from passing resolutions calling for trials.

It explains why the President still prevents the records of the Roberts Commission and the testimony of its 127 witnesses being made public.

It explains the Presidential order which forbade Admiral Hopper a year ago to testify about Pearl Harbor to a committee of Congress.

It explains why no information has been given out as to the investigation by Admiral Hani, at the suggestion of Secretary Knox.

It explains investigation number 4, now being held behind closed doors.

While House pressure succeeded in substituting secret hearing number 4, for a proposed resolution of Congress calling for immediate court-martial.

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#### EXHIBIT No. 4

10 AUGUST 1944.

*Confidential*

Colonel CHARLES W. WEST, JAGD,  
Recorder, Army Pearl Harbor Board,  
Room 4741, Munitions Building,  
Washington 25, D. C.

DEAR COLONEL: General Miles has asked me to write to you requesting a copy of the transcript of his evidence before the Board. The General desires this copy of the transcript because he is concerned with the possibility of his evidence showing an inaccurate statement of fact.

General Miles would have written to you personally on this matter but he is now on an inspection trip and by long distance telephone he communicated with me today, asking me to make this request of you. The General will be at this headquarters on Tuesday, 15 August 1944, and I can assure you that he will examine and return the same immediately.

I trust everything is going well with you and that you are enjoying your assignment.

Sincerely,

DANIEL L. O'DONNELL,  
Lt. Colonel, J. A. G. D.,  
Service Command Judge Advocate.

WAR DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON

HEADQUARTERS ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD,  
*Munitions Building, 12 August 1944.*

Lt. Col. DANIEL L. O'DONNELL, J. A. G. D.  
*Hqs. First Service Command,  
Boston 15, Massachusetts.*

DEAR COLONEL O'DONNELL: Pursuant to your request of 10 August 1944, I am enclosing herewith a copy of the transcript of General Miles' testimony. Certain minor inaccuracies such as typographical errors, may appear therein which we haven't yet had an opportunity to correct but will do so at the earliest opportunity. May I suggest that the matter of any possibly "inaccurate statement of fact" be made the subject of a letter to General Grunert.

Please return the transcript when it has served its purpose. With kindest regards, I am.

Sincerely yours,

Charles W. West,  
CHARLES W. WEST,  
*Colonel, J. A. G. D.,  
Recorder.*

1 Incl: Transcript.

[91] TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. SHERMAN MILES, COMMANDING 1ST SERVICE  
COMMAND, BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

Colonel WEST. General, will you state to the Board your name, rank, organization and station?

General MILES. Sherman Miles, Major General, Commanding 1st Service Command, Boston, Massachusetts.

General GRUNERT. General Miles, the Board, in an attempt to get at the facts, is looking into the War Department background and viewpoint prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. It is hoped that, because of your assignment as A. C. of S. G-2, at that time, you can throw some light on the subject. In order to cover so large a field in the limited time available, individual Board members have been assigned objectives or phases for special investigation, although the entire Board will pass upon the objectives and phases. General Russell has this particular phase. So he will lead in propounding the questions and the other members will assist in developing them. So I will turn you over to the mercies of General Russell.

General RUSSELL. What was your assignment in the year 1941?

General MILES. I was Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department.

General RUSSELL. Can you remember approximately the date on which you entered upon that assignment?

General MILES. May 1, 1940.

General RUSSELL. When were you relieved or transferred from that assignment?

[92] General MILES. The end of January 1942.

General RUSSELL. During that period of time you were actually the head of what we know as G-2 which embraced the Military Intelligence Division. Was that the name of it?

General MILES. That was the official name—Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff.

General RUSSELL. Briefly stated, General Miles, what were the functions of the G-2 section, including this Military Intelligence Division?

General MILES. The Military Intelligence Division, General, was all-inclusive. It was the whole thing, not as it is now, broken and divided between G-2 and Military Intelligence Service. It was all one division, just as the Operations and Training Division, or the Personnel Division, War Plans Division, and so forth. I was head of the entire division, which, in turn, was divided into counter-intelligence, positive intelligence, and in turn that was divided geographically to cover the world, or as much as we could cover.



General RUSSELL. Definitely, General Miles, as to the operations of your department related to the Japanese Government during your period of service there, what were you attempting to learn about the Japanese Government?

General MILES. We were attempting to learn everything we could about the Japanese Government, and had been doing so, in fact, a great many yaers. It was only one of the nations which we were attempting to cover, to gather all possible information about. Our system was a running digest.

General GRUNERT. May I interrupt there? If anything which [93] you put into the record is of such a nature as might be of value to other nations now, I wish you would consider that and, if so, give us that information in closed session, so that it will not be disclosed to anybody who may be able to see this record. Do you see what I am getting at?

General MILES. Yes, sir; I understand.

This summary digest was maintained on the principal countries of the world. Such a system is no secret. It has been maintained by practically every government. It was a running digest covering the military side, the political side, the economic side, and the psychological side. All the information that ever came in from any country to G-2 was collated and put into this digest and sent out to the various military attaches and G-2s, all the corps areas and overseas departments who were interested in a particular country, in the form of corrected loose-leaf, so that you had a running build-up constantly. This had been going on, to my knowledge, for ~~thirty~~ twenty years. In addition to that, of course, we sent out bi-weekly, as I remember, military intelligence summaries, which were short documents of facts that we had gotten in in the last two or three days from all sorts of agencies that we had. I say all sorts, because we kept in very close touch with the State Department, the Department of Commerce, the Rockefeller people in South America, and, of course, our own military attaches and observers that we had throughout the world.

That, in general, was our system of getting information and disseminating it.

General RUSSELL. Did the G-2 section, as such, have [94] personnel available for investigations in foreign fields in the year 1941?

General MILES. A limited personnel, General. We were building up. When I took over Military Intelligence in May of 1940 I remember there were 36 officers in the entire division. We built up rapidly to something over 400, with an equal proportion of clerical personnel. We built up very rapidly, as the war came nearer and nearer, our agencies in the field, field observers, military attaches. Our personnel was always limited. We did not have unlimited money or unlimited selection, of officers; particularly of officers. That was a time when the Army was building very rapidly. The natural inclination of a soldier is to go with troops and remain with troops. The general officers, in the field of course wanted the best men, naturally, and should have had them. ~~and~~ We did not have a free field for the selection of personnel, and quite rightly. We did the best we could with the personnel and the funds we had available.

General RUSSELL. About when did this personnel reach its maximum development of 400?

General MILES. Well, it was increasing all the time I was there. I do not know. I imagine it continued to increase after I left. I am pretty sure it did, I cannot place any date on any maximum reached.

General RUSSELL. Can you approximate the number of people who were available to you for service in Washington and throughout the country and in foreign fields, in October and November of 1941?

[95] General MILES. General, I would not try to answer that question from my memory. The records are certainly available to you. I could not do it.

General RUSSELL. General, a moment ago you referred to monthly or bi-monthly documents of some kind that were sent to the corps commanders and to the overseas departments. Did your office maintain copies of those reports?

General MILES. Oh, yes.

General RUSSELL. Are they in the files now?

General MILES. I imagine they are, sir. They are permanent records of the Military Intelligence Division.

General RUSSELL. There would be no reason to destroy them at all?

General MILES. Not that I know of.

General RUSSELL. I want at this point to say that I have asked for a search of the records over there and have looked at the records, but did not discover copies of such reports, although specifically I have asked for such reports. I am giving you that, because it may be necessary for us to conduct a further search to locate, if possible, these documents.

Now, to discuss for a moment the sources of information which you have divulged already and to limit it to Japanese information, what sources of information were there in Japan in the fall of 1941 on which you as G-2 could rely as to activities of the Japanese at home and in home waters?

General MILES. Within the United States?

General RUSSELL. No. I am now addressing myself to the situation in Japan and have asked what agencies or what sources existed in Japan upon which you could rely for information [96] about Japanese activities at home and in Hawaii.

General MILES. I would say that by far the most important source was our Embassy in Tokyo. We had a very excellent Ambassador who had been there a number of years with a staff that had been there a good deal longer than that. We had, of course, used the military attache and his assistants. The information which we could get on the military side from our military attache and his assistants was of course very limited; the Japanese being extremely close-mouthed. But the Embassy itself was constantly sending in dispatches to the State Department—Mr. Grev, particularly—on the state of mind of the Japanese people and the probability of what they were going to do next, and so forth. We also, of course, had direct access, through our very close connection with the State Department, to what was transpiring in the negotiations in the fall of 1941 here in Washington. Aside from that, I do not think there were any important sources of information in Japan. We were getting a good deal of information from what might be called the borders; in other words, China, and even the part of the Continent occupied by the Japanese. The Koreans would get out once in a while and we would get some information in that way. We exchanged information very freely with the British and, to a certain extent, with the Dutch. They were a little afraid to give us information, as I remember, but we were getting some.

General RUSSELL. Did the British have any organization within the homeland of Japan which was watching the movement of their Army and Navy in the fall of 1941?

General MILES. I believe that they had about the same as [97] we had. As to actually watching the movements of ships and troops, it was necessarily a system that worked sometimes and did not work at other times. You might see the ships move or the troops move, or you might not.

General RUSSELL. General Miles, is it true or not that from the State Department or from our Ambassador to Japan the information which we obtained related almost exclusively to the state of mind of the Japanese people toward the war and their enmity toward the United States?

General MILES. Are you putting that in the form of a question, sir?

General RUSSELL. Yes. Is it true or not that that was the case?

General MILES. That was the Ambassador's principal concern, naturally. I would not say, from my memory of the information that we got from our Embassy, that that by any means covered the field.

General RUSSELL. Do you remember a message from our Ambassador along in the fall of 1941, in which he summed up the situation and told the State Department to what extent they could rely upon him for information of troop movements, movements of the Navy, and so forth?

General MILES. I do not recall that particular message, General.

General RUSSELL. Maybe I can refresh your memory. May I ask you this as a preliminary? Did you attend the conferences that were held by the Secretary of State, which he refers to as the War Councils, where he had ordinarily the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and some of our high-ranking military [98] and naval people in to discuss the Japanese situation?

General MILES. No, sir. I think only the Chief of Staff attended them.

General RUSSELL. I refer particularly to this message which is contained in the State Department's book that they call the White Paper, which is a report from our Ambassador to Japan on the 17th day of November, I believe, 1941 (handing a book to the witness).

General MILES. What is the question, now, sir?

General RUSSELL. When did you first know about that message?

General MILES. I don't remember, General; I can't answer that question.

General FRANK. Did you know about it at all?

General MILES. I am not sure that I did. I think I did, because we had very close liaison with the State Department. I feel sure that I did; but, frankly, it is so obvious a message that the impression it gives me today is



probably the same impression it gave me then: "Yes, of course I know we can't count on ~~it~~ the Embassy. How can we be sure that any group can tell us the movement of the Japanese fleet or army?" We knew we could not.

General RUSSELL. In other words, the information which you have testified that you had from Japan about what was going on over there was rather general and indefinite in its nature?

General GRUNERT. Unless we know about that message the record will not be intelligible. Is it going to be copied into the record?

General RUSSELL. Yes.

Your information about the activities in Japan in the fall [99] of 1941 was very indefinite and general?

General MILES. Necessarily so.

General RUSSELL. The message from Ambassador Grew in Japan to the Secretary of State for purposes of the record will be identified as a paraphrase of a telegram dated November 17, 1941, and it may be copied from page 788 of this White Paper entitled "Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941."

(Telegram from Ambassador Grew to Secretary of State, dated November 17, 1941, is as follows:)

"The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

"(Telegram: Paraphrase)

"Tokyo, November 17, 1941—1 p. m.

"Received November 17—2:09 p. m.)

"1814. Referring to Embassy's previous telegram No. 1736 of November 3, 3 p. m., final sentence, and emphasizing the need to guard against sudden Japanese naval or military actions in such areas as are not now involved in the Chinese theater of operations. I take into account the probability of the Japanese exploiting every possible tactical advantage, such as surprise and initiative. Accordingly you are advised of not placing the major responsibility in giving prior warning upon the Embassy staff, the naval and military attaches included, since in Japan there is extremely effective control over both primary and secondary military information. We would not expect to obtain any information in advance either from personal Japanese contacts or through the press; the observation of [100] military movements is not possible by the few Americans remaining in the country, concentrated mostly in three cities (Tokyo, Yokohama, Kobe); and with American and other foreign shipping absent from adjacent waters the Japanese are assured of the ability to send without foreign observation their troop transports in various directions. Japanese troop concentrations were reported recently by American consuls in Manchuria and Formosa, while troop dispositions since last July's general mobilization have, according to all other indications available, been made with a view to enabling the carrying out of new operations on the shortest possible notice either in the Pacific southwest or in Siberia or in both.

"We are fully aware that our present most important duty perhaps is to detect any premonitory signs of naval or military operations likely in areas mentioned above and every precaution is being taken to guard against surprise. The Embassy's field of naval or military observation is restricted almost literally to what could be seen with the naked eye, and this is negligible. Therefore, you are advised, from an abundance of caution, to discount as much as possible the likelihood of our ability to give substantial warning.

"GREW"

General RUSSELL. General Miles, referring to the statement which is contained in Ambassador Grew's message: "and with American and other foreign shipping absent from adjacent waters the Japanese are assured of the [101] ability to send without foreign observation their troop transports in various directions."

As a matter of information, do you know why at that particular time there was an absence of American and foreign shipping in Japanese waters?

General MILES. No, sir. I do not remember knowing of any particular absence of American shipping from Japanese waters at that time. Of course we had had information for a great many years which had been considered in all of our war plans in Hawaii that there was a certain part of the Pacific Ocean that we called the "Vacant Sea" in which there are practically no ships and in which large movement of ships could occur without anybody seeing them. It was that part of the ocean between the great southern routes that go from Hawaii to the coast of Japan and China, and the northern great circle routes that go near the Aleutians.

General RUSSELL. The term which you used intrigues me. What was it you called it?

General MILES. I used to call it the "Vacant Sea."

General RUSSELL. As applied to that part of the Pacific adjacent to the mandated islands, would you say that they were in the area of the "Vacant Sea" or not?

General MILES. No, sir. The southern trade routes, as I remember, from Hawaii to Yokohama, we will say, pass considerably north of most of the mandated islands, such as the Marianas. All the seas surrounding the mandated islands were, as you know, extremely difficult for us to penetrate and get any information on for other reasons.

General RUSSELL. Why?

[102] General MILES. Because the Japanese would not allow us in there. You might sail through, but you would not see very much. That had existed for many years.

General RUSSELL. Was there any restriction on Americans landing on those islands that were mandated to the Japanese?

General MILES. Absolutely, sir.

General RUSSELL. Were Americans prohibited from landing in the mandated islands?

General MILES. Well, they did not say "Americans are prohibited," but Americans did not land. That was well known for years. No American warship went in there.

General FRANK. Do you know of any American port or any point over which the United States had jurisdiction that excluded Jap vessels or Japanese nationals?

General MILES. No, sir.

General RUSSELL. Do you know where there is any documentary evidence of the exclusion of Americans from the Japanese mandated islands?

General MILES. General, I would not know exactly where to put my hand on documentary evidence. It was one of the things perfectly well known to all of us in the Intelligence. I should think probably the Navy Department could aid you in that respect. I am pretty sure that the Navy Department several times tried to get ships in there.

General GRUNERT. As far as the so-called mandated islands are concerned, they were sort of a blind spot for our Military Intelligence, were they?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

[103] General RUSSELL. That is exactly what I was trying to find out.

How far are the Marshall Islands from Honolulu?

General MILES. My recollection is, about 1,600 miles. I would not swear to it.

General RUSSELL. General, were you acquainted with the plans for the defense of Pearl Harbor and the estimates in connection with the Japanese situation as to the probabilities of attack? Were all those things known to you at G-2?

General MILES. Rather intimately. I was G-3 of the Hawaiian Department from 1929 to 1931. I rewrote the war plan. I wrote the general staff study and estimate of the situation, which was the "bible" at that time and for some years. Then from 1934 to 1938 I was here in War Plans Division and was particularly charged with the three overseas departments, their projects and their plans. So, up to 1938, at least, and between 1929 and 1938, I was intimately acquainted with it.

General RUSSELL. In our brief study of the plan generally and the evidence just given by you, there was considerable emphasis placed on a probability of an attack on Pearl Harbor by carrier-borne aircraft. During the year 1941 you were, of course, familiar with the estimate and the probabilities?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. Did it occur to you as G-2 from what port or ports these carriers might depart on a mission of that sort?

General MILES. They might have departed on a mission from a great many ports. We did not know really what bases they had in the mandated islands, and obviously they could have departed [104] from almost any port in Japan, such as Kobe or Yokohama.

General RUSSELL. You stated that you did not know what bases they had in the mandated islands?

General MILES. Very little information on bases in the mandated islands.

General RUSSELL. As I recall, they acquired jurisdiction, such as they had over the mandated islands, as a result of the settlement at the end of the other war in 1918?

General MILES. That is correct.

General RUSSELL. And in 1941 they had had approximately twenty years to develop their bases in the mandated islands, their ports and so forth. Was



there any information in G-2 in preparing ports and bases in any of the mandated islands?

General MILES. Very little, and very general information. We knew that they were developing certain places, such as Palau and Truk particularly, and we suspected Saipan. We relied very largely on information in military and from Naval Intelligence. Taken together it could not have been called any detailed or complete information of possible bases in the mandated islands.

General FRANK. Did you have anything on the Island of Jaluit?

General MILES. I do not remember what we had on Jaluit, but it was one of the islands that we used to discuss and suspect that they were developing.

General RUSSELL. General Miles, in the fall of 1941 did you in G-2 have sufficient data on Japanese developments in the mandated islands to predicate an intelligent opinion as to the [105] possibilities of launching convoys from there which might have included aircraft carriers?

General MILES. I would say that positively we knew enough to form an estimate that such a thing was a strong possibility, not a probability; that they had the means. That they would do it is another matter. They had the means to do it. I would say that our estimate at the time was that it was very possible, if not probable, that they did have those means.

General RUSSELL. Do you know whether or not the data on these developments on the mandated islands is a matter of record any place in the G-2 files?

General MILES. Oh, yes; we had files on them. We had maps and whatever we could get. The Office of Naval Intelligence had even more.

General RUSSELL. Did those maps show the developments, or just show where the islands were?

General MILES. So far as possible we made charts of the islands from one source or another and plotted on those charts, both Naval Intelligence and ours, where we thought they were developing, from what information we could get from traveling natives or missionaries or what have you.

General RUSSELL. I was asking you some questions a moment ago about the inhibition as to our going on those mandated islands. Were the inhibitions against going into the mandated islands only those of force or semi-force by the Japanese people who were there?

General MILES. That is what kept us away, General.

General RUSSELL. They just would not let you go in?

[106] General MILES. They just would not let us go in. They had one excuse or another. I don't remember just exactly what they were; but the net result was that mighty few people got into the mandated islands.

General RUSSELL. Did you attempt to send people from G-2 into the mandated islands in 1941?

General MILES. No, sir. I do not think any attempt had been made by G-2 for ten years. We knew we could not do it and get them out.

General RUSSELL. Were there any restrictions imposed on G-2 from higher authority about attempting to get in there and develop that situation in the mandated islands?

General MILES. Not specifically the mandated islands; no, sir.

General RUSSELL. But you did regard the geographic location of these mandated islands with respect to our naval base at Pearl Harbor as being rather material?

General MILES. Yes, I did, General; but, on the other hand, we knew perfectly well that Japan could attack the Hawaiian Islands without the use of the mandates. I remember very well writing one plan in which we developed the other side, based on a surprise attack launched from the mainland of Japan, with fast cruisers and carriers, carrying troops on their most rapid liners. We worked it up, just how they would take those liners off their routes for one reason or another—this one to be repaired, and so forth—and suddenly launch this an attack from the "Vacant Sea," and suddenly arrive in Honolulu. So the mandates were always a black shadow, but they were not [107] the only means of attacking Hawaii, and we it as far back as the early 1930's.

General RUSSELL. In those studies which were made by you, and others with which you may be familiar, did you ever consider steps which might be taken to discover in advance the mission and dispatch of these convoys to carry out that type of attack?

General MILES. We considered it, General, but, as Ambassador Grew says in that famous dispatch, "Don't rely on us from that point of view." It was much more as we attacked the problem from the other side.

General FRANK. What do you mean by that?

General MILES. I mean, from the Hawaiian side, particularly air reconnaissance and submarine reconnaissance [handwritten: by our own people in Hawaii] to detect any force coming in before it could actually attack. I recall particularly during all of General Drum's command out there in the middle 1930's that he was very much interested ~~and~~ in it. He was constantly sending in papers to War Plans, and they were coming to my desk, involving the possibility of a screen of large bombers which would cover the entire enormous perimeter containing the ~~in~~ these five big Hawaiian islands. That was a current matter almost. Then, of course, the submarine screen was another matter that was constantly discussed. We had about twenty submarines out there in the middle 1930's.

But, to answer your question more succinctly, I do not think any Intelligence officer ever thought that he could be sure of picking up a convoy or attack force or task force in Japan before it sailed and know where it was going. That was beyond our ~~terms~~ dreams of efficiency.

[108] General RUSSELL. Or even the mandated islands?

General MILES. Rather less in the mandated islands.

General RUSSELL. You had less chance there?

General MILES. Yes.

General GRUNERT. Would such a force moving from one of the mandated islands indicate where it was going? Would there be a clear indication that it was bound for Hawaii or elsewhere?

General MILES. It would be no indication at all where it was going, General. (There was informal discussion off the record.)

General RUSSELL. The G-2 people in their studies had to all intents and purposes eliminated investigations in Japan proper and other Japanese territory to determine probable action on the part of the Japanese Army and Navy?

General MILES. Oh, no, sir. We had not eliminated it. As Mr. Grew says, it was the principal task of the Embassy, particularly of the military and naval part of the Embassy. What I say is just what Mr. Grew says, that we never dreamed that we could rely on getting that information. It would have been almost a military intelligence miracle had we been able to spot a task force in forming and have known before it sailed where it was going.

General RUSSELL. Now, general, if that be true, then the conclusion has been reached, so far as discovering task forces of any sort moving to the Hawaiian Islands, that the chief if not the sole reliance would have to be placed on reconnaissance agencies based on the islands or on United States possessions contiguous thereto?

[109] General MILES. Yes, and at sea. I mean, by submarine and air power.

General RUSSELL. Do you recall when the last estimate of the situation was sent out to the Hawaiian Department from G-2?

General FRANK. Prior to December 7?

General RUSSELL. Yes; prior to December 7, 1941.

General MILES. General, I do not know that any estimate of the situation, if you are using that term strictly, was sent. What we sent were those corrected sheets of the digest on Japan from time to time, whenever we got the information, and copies of the bi-weekly summary. The estimate of the situation is for the information of the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War. G-2 is the G-2 of the General Staff. I am bringing up that point because I had to be very careful, and I think all G-2s of the General Staff have to be very careful. ~~The~~ the information you give your Chief is something which he must pass on from the command point of view. If that information is habitually sent out to the various overseas departments particularly, you run into the serious danger of telling the Lieutenant General commanding the Hawaiian Department, we will say, something that G-2 thinks which the Chief of Staff does not concur in, and forcing his hand or inducing him to take some action in which the Chief of Staff does not concur. In other words, you must be careful to keep out of the command channel. So you give your information, your summary, your estimate of the situation, to your Chief, and action must flow from the Chief through the command channels; and G-2 is not in the command channels.

[110] General GRUNERT. Insofar as action is concerned on the information that is passed to the subordinate command, is that action then passed back through G-2, or does G-2 prepare it for the Chief of Staff insofar as it pertains to information?

General MILES. I do not know that I have your question clearly.



General GRUNERT. You have gotten information from various sources which influenced you to make an estimate of the situation, which you passed to the Chief of Staff. Now, there are parts of that information, if true, that certain command channels in the Philippines or Hawaii should get. Who insures that they get that information?

General MILES. As a routine matter, G-2 insures it. In other words, all information that pertained directly to the Hawaiian Department or to the Philippine Department that G-2 received, it insured that G-2 in that Department got it. That is exclusive, however, of any deductions in a very broad sense that G-2 of the War Department might draw which would induce action. The latter, in other words, is a command proposition.

General GRUNERT. In other words, you give them the information, but you do not analyze it; or do you?

General MILES. Ordinarily you do not analyze it for them.

General FRANK. You gave information and interpretation only through command channels?

General MILES. Interpretation would certainly go only through command channels.

General GRUNERT. Any warning, then, should come from command channels rather than from G-2?

[111] General MILES. If it is warning that probably would result in action, yes, most definitely.

General RUSSELL. Your G-2 sent a message on November 27 out to G-2 of the Hawaiian Department?

General MILES. Yes; to all departments, as I remember.

General RUSSELL. Now, a few specific questions, General Miles, and I will be through:

On October 27, 1941, Brink reported to your office that there were two aircraft carriers that had been operating among the mandated islands, of which Kaga was one. Was Brink one of your operators?

General MILES. How is the name spelled?

General RUSSELL. B-r-i-n-k.

General GRUNERT. Was there not a Colonel Brink for a time in Singapore, and then he went to the Philippines?

General MILES. Yes; that was the man, I think.

General RUSSELL. This was sent from the Philippines?

General MILES. Yes.

General GRUNERT. He was one of the staff in the office of the A. C. of S., G-2, Philippine Department, and on my recommendation he was sent to Singapore to be directly under the War Department there. That is why I recall a man named Brink.

General RUSSELL. Do you have any recollection about that type of Japanese aircraft carrier being in the mandated islands? Do you have any independent recollection on that subject?

General MILES. I remember that the Japanese carriers were reported in the mandated islands, but I would not be able to [112] pin it down to any particular source.

General RUSSELL. Would it be about that time?

General MILES. It was about that time.

General RUSSELL. In the records some place we have discovered evidence of a photographic mission by aircraft down into the mandated islands in late November or early December of 1941. Do you have any independent recollection of that activity on our part?

General MILES. No, sir; I did not know we sent one.

General RUSSELL. You were in touch in a general way with the Navy at that time in obtaining information from them?

General MILES. I was intimately in touch with the Office of Naval Intelligence.

General RUSSELL. What did you know from the Navy about the location and disposition of the Japanese fleet in late November and early December? Do you remember?

General MILES. My recollection is that the Navy had information of carriers in the mandates, and definitely of a movement of naval vessels and transports, they thought, south through the China Sea in the direction of Indo China and Thailand.

General RUSSELL. What was your impression as to the knowledge which the Navy had generally during the last six months before the attack on Pearl

Harbor of the location of the Jap Navy and various types of craft that were in their Navy?

General MILES. Their information was very general and incomplete.

General RUSSELL. General, when in your opinion did it [113] become apparent that war with Japan was inevitable?

General MILES. On the 27th of November, when we learned that we had practically given what might be considered or probably would be considered by them an ultimatum from then on I considered war as very probable if not ultimately inevitable.

General RUSSELL. That was based almost exclusively on the negotiations between the Japanese who were in Washington negotiating with our State Department?

General MILES. Primarily on that. It was a build-up.

General RUSSELL. In the message of November 27, which I will not discuss with you in any great detail, there was a statement that negotiations had practically ended. I am not quoting, but it said substantially that—although there was a bare possibility that the Japanese might come back for further negotiations. Do you remember that?

General MILES. That was in General Marshall's dispatch?

General RUSSELL. Yes.

General MILES. I do not remember that; no.

General RUSSELL. Let us assume that they did come back after November 27 and continued negotiations: Would that have affected your conclusions about the inevitability of war?

General MILES. Oh, yes.

General RUSSELL. As a matter of fact, they were back on the 1st, 2nd, and 5th of December, were they not?

General MILES. The Japanese reply was not back, sir.

General RUSSELL. I mean, the Japs came back and negotiated.

[114] General MILES. Oh, they continued to stay here and talk, but ~~that~~ it all hinged, to my mind, on the reply or the position taken by the Japanese Government as a result of ~~our~~ the U. S. paper on the 26th of November, I think it was, ~~it~~ which was considered practically an ultimatum.

General RUSSELL. I think that is all.

General GRUNERT. I have a few questions.

General MILES. I should like, if I may, to add a little bit. I am not quite sure of my answer ~~there~~. I did regarding inevitable war. I do not want to give the impression that I thought on November 27th that war was immediately inevitable. I thought that, very definitely, ~~an~~ some action by Japan, a pretty radical action, would be taken almost at once; but that ~~we~~ need not necessarily ~~would~~ be an overt and open attack on the United States. I didn't feel at all sure that war with Japan was ~~practically~~ immediately inevitable any time. ~~But~~ There were a good many things Japan could have done, if she ~~did break~~ those broke her negotiations in Washington short of open war with the United States, and we were considering all of those ~~matters~~ possibilities.

General RUSSELL. That suggests one other question: Did you know that there had been established by reference to the degrees of latitude and longitude lines beyond which, if Japan went with armed force out in the Pacific, the British, Dutch, and Americans would regard that as an act of war?

General MILES. Yes.

General RUSSELL. Then you knew as G-2 that if certain things occurred, we, in association with those powers, might attack?

General MILES. Yes; certainly.

[115] General FRANK. You said you were not prevented specifically by higher authority from attempting to get information regarding the Japanese mandated islands. Was there any general prohibition in this regard? Was there a general attitude of "hands off"?

General MILES. Not specifically affecting the mandated islands. It was simply a question of whether you wanted to send a man to his almost certain death or not, and whether the information you expected to get out of it would be worth that risk. But there was no general or specific prohibition against my sending a man into the mandated islands if I could get him there. But I did not think I could get him in there and get him back alive, or get information from him while there.



General GRUNERT. Was there or was there not a fear on the part of all concerned that doing so and being picked up after having done so would offend the Japanese?

General MILES. Oh, it most certainly would. We would have had to disavow it and swear that we never sent him, and so forth. That is an old part of the game.

General FRANK. On November 27 there went out a message from G-2 of the War Department, which was your organization, saying:

"Advise only Commanding General and Chief of Staff that it appears that conference with the Japanese has ended in an apparent deadlock. Acts of sabotage and espionage probable. Also possible that hostilities may begin."

Do you remember that message?

General MILES. Very well.

[116] General FRANK. You are familiar with the war plan as it applied to Honolulu, the Standing Operating Procedure?

General MILES. Yes; in a general way.

General FRANK. Did not the provisions of that war plan and the Standing Operating Procedure provide for this defense against sabotage?

General MILES. Yes; it provided against all forms of attack, including sabotage.

General FRANK. Why, then, was sabotage especially emphasized in that message?

General MILES. I will be very glad to answer that question, General, but my answer must be somewhat long.

In the summer of 1939 the President issued a directive to all bureaus and offices of the Government to keep out of antisabotage and antiespionage work, except three that were to do it all, F. B. I., O. N. I. and M. I. D. After I took M. I. D. in May of 1940, I began to build up the counter-intelligence part of it. I drafted a written agreement with F. B. I. and O. N. I. delimiting our responsibilities under the President's directive. It was then countersigned by the three Cabinet Ministers concerned. Then I drew up a counter-subversive system for the Army, and later a counter-intelligence fifth-column plan, the first one we ever had. I met certain opposition among my colleagues, the other Assistant Chiefs of Staff and I am relating this only to point out that by the summer of 1941 I had gotten myself in a position where it was definitely established that counter-subversive activity of all kinds was G-2's responsibility and solely G-2's responsibility. I shared the [117] responsibility for measures against an effort overt to attack by a possible enemy with Operations and with War Plans, because I was supposed to give the information on which their orders were based. But I shared with nobody the responsibility for counter-subversive measures, and therefore, when I found on the 27th of November that nothing was specifically said about sabotage in General Marshall's dispatch of that date, the war warning order, I felt it necessary to warn the G-2's, not only of the overseas departments ~~and later~~ but particularly those in this country. It was ~~but~~ sent it to all of the corps area G-2s, because we knew the build-up in this country very well. The F. B. I., the O. N. I., and my people were very worried about what could be done in this country, particularly to the Air Force. General Arnold was very much worried ~~and that~~ He broke loose the next day and occasioned the further dispatch of November 28.

So that was the reason for the emphasis. The policy had already been laid down by General Marshall's telegram of the 27th. So I was simply backing up the policy of the Chief of Staff and emphasizing the form of attack for which I was most directly responsible ~~at~~ as G-2, [handwritten:] and reiterating the possibility of open hostilities.

General FRANK. In the beginning of General Russell's questions you gave an answer to the effect that as a result of your background and experience you had felt a strong probability of an air raid or air attack on Honolulu. Is that correct?

General MILES. That was one of the methods of attack to which we were most vulnerable.

General FRANK. At this time, we will say, December 1, 1941, what was your attitude as to the probability of such an [118] air attack?

General MILES. If the Japs attack openly at all, and if their attack was made on Hawaii, I think I would have said on December 1, 1941, that an air attack on the Pearl Harbor installations and the fleet (although I did not actually know the ships were there in Pearl Harbor) was one of the most probable movements that the Japs would take.

General FRANK. Since you went out of your way to caution them about sabotage, why did you not likewise go out of your way to caution them about the probability of an air attack?

General MILES. Because, General, all that had been covered in General Marshall's dispatch in which he specifically ordered such necessary reconnaissances—I remember the use of that word—to protect the Hawaiian Department against attack. And that was the only way—that, and of course radar—that such an attack could have been countered. My message also warned of possible hostilities.

General FRANK. You knew that the following day General Arnold sent a message with respect to sabotage?

General MILES. Yes, indeed.

General FRANK. Did the logic ever occur to you that as a result of emphasizing sabotage in a series of messages it might have the result of de-emphasizing something else?

General MILES. That had occurred to me. I very strongly objected to General Arnold's message on the basis, among other things, that I did not want to overemphasize sabotage and that I had already sent the day before a sufficient message to cover the question of sabotage.

General FRANK. As hindsight, of course, and considering [119] the fact that provisions for all of these defenses were covered in the war plans and other documents, would not the following message have sufficed:

"War imminent. Act accordingly."

General MILES. For me to send?

General FRANK. No; for the War Department to have sent. That would not have emphasized nor de-emphasized anything, would it?

General MILES. I would prefer not to pass upon the Chief of Staff's wording in his message of November 27.

General FRANK. There were six messages sent between November 16th and 28th. Four of them cautioned against provoking the Japs; three of them emphasized sabotage. Now, with respect to caution against provoking the Japs: while we were leaning over backward as a result of these cautions, what was the attitude of the Japanese, relatively speaking?

General MILES. Their attitude where, General? Here in Washington, in the negotiations?

General FRANK. All over the world. Were they as particular about preventing any suspicion on our part as we were particular about trying to prevent any provocation on their part?

General MILES. Oh, no. They had been provocative for a great many years, particularly since they began their attack on China.

General FRANK. Will you develop that in just a few words?

General MILES. I should say that the Japanese attack in Manchuria and later in China, which, after all, was the basis [120] of our diplomatic negotiations here in Washington in 1941 was the basic cause of it, was the beginning of a very provocative attitude on the part of the Japanese.

General FRANK. What I am after is this: There was little or no attempt on the Japanese side to keep from provoking us, where as there was every effort on the part of the Americans to keep from provoking the Japanese; is that correct?

General MILES. I should say as a general statement that that is very accurate, sir.

General FRANK. I asked that of you because you should have information on that as the War Department G-2 at that time.

General MILES. Yes, sir; but I think it was very general information that at Shanghai and all through the Peiping episode, they had been very provocative, as we all knew; and it was the policy of our Government not to provoke war; to take a firm stand in a certain way, as you know, but not to provoke war with Japan. At least, so we read it.

General FRANK. Do you think that we were leaning over backwards in that attitude?

General MILES. That is a very difficult question to answer, General. I simply say that our policy was to avoid any unnecessary provocative action.

[121] General FRANK. You said you objected to General Arnold's message. To whom?

General MILES. To General Arnold, in the first place, and later, to General Scanlon. It was quite a long discussion, as I remember it.



General FRANK. What were the circumstances under which your objection was finally overcome and the message sent?

General MILES. It had to go to the Deputy Chief of Staff, General Bryden. General Marshall was away. General Bryden did not want to decide it, either, very much. I objected strongly and was backed up by General Gerow. ~~and~~ Our objections were on this line: (1) ~~this~~ an antisabotage message had gone out; (2) ~~that~~ a the proposed message should not go to the air forces alone, but if sent at all, should go to the Commanding Generals for their air forces and for everybody else; and (3) ~~that~~ the message as originally drawn was very drastic. As you know very well, at that time, the Air Force had a lot of young men in command of fields and so forth, and a very drastic order, from General Arnold, particularly, to ~~enrge~~ protect planes and so forth, might very well have resulted in somebody's being shot.

I would also like to say, here, that General Arnold's message was primarily addressed to the continental United States; he was thinking about that. What started him was the fact about seven planes arrived at one of your western fields—I think at Salt Lake—all with the same trouble, and from different depots, and he thought there was some real sabotage going on in this country. But, to go on with the story, we finally had to take it to the Deputy Chief of Staff, late that afternoon of the 28th. I don't think it was decided until [122] about six o'clock. General Scanlon was present, presenting the Air side, and I think, General Gerow and General Gullion, Provost Marshal General and General Bryden finally decided that it would be sent in modified form; that is, not directing such drastic action ~~to be taken~~ against anybody who might climb over a fence; and that it would be sent to the Commanding Generals, and that the Air Corps might also, if they desired, send it direct under General Arnold's name to the Air Force, to the Air Commanders concerned: ~~and~~ that was the final decision.

General FRANK. Now, another question that I am asking because G-2 might have drawn a conclusion on it: What was the attitude of the public toward the possibility of war at that time? Can you answer that?

General MILES. I can only give you my impression, that they were not nearly as much worried about it as they should have been. After all, it was only a few months ~~past~~ since we had saved the Army by one vote in the House of Representatives. You remember, I think it was in October 1941 that that vote was taken, and we just barely saved the Army at that time.

General FRANK. What do you mean, "saved the Army"?

General MILES. Well, you remember there was a bill, sir, to send back all the men that had been drafted, put them back on the reserve, or something like that.

General RUSSELL. A bill to demobilize the National Guard.

General MILES. To demobilize the National Guard and send the draftees back. The War Department was extremely worried about it.

General FRANK. Aside from the people "top side" in the Army, can you give me an expression of what the attitude in the [123] Army was with respect to the possibility of war?

General MILES. Not accurately. I attended the North Carolina maneuvers, ~~that November, preceding November,~~ early preceding November, and I don't remember to have heard the matter discussed. The Army in those days, as you well remember, we all remember, was intensely busy in building itself and training and maneuvering and so forth. I would not say the Army as a whole were much concerned as to where war was going to break if they could get their troops ready before the break.

General FRANK. Do you think they felt that war was on the horizon?

General MILES. The Army?

General FRANK. Yes.

General MILES. Yes, sir.

General FRANK. All right.

General MILES. Not necessarily with Japan, but war was on the horizon.

General FRANK. Did you know that there was a Japanese striking force consisting of several carriers and a couple of battleships and a submarine force in the Marshall Islands, in the vicinity of Jaluit, about the 1st of December?

General MILES. I knew that such a force had been reported about there, and about that time.

General FRANK. Was that information given to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department?

General MILES. I don't know, sir. I do not remember.

General FRANK. Have you any way of determining that?

General MILES. The records of the Military Intelligence Department undoubtedly will disclose it.

[124] General FRANK. If it were given?

General MILES. Yes, if it were given. I feel very sure that in one form or another he was informed of that report. I say "in one form or another" because one form might very well have been through Navy and Fleet.

General FRANK. Information on the situation surrounding the Hawaiian Islands, you stated some time back, information as to the presence of hostile activity in the waters, would mainly be obtained through submarine reconnaissance and air reconnaissance?

General MILES. That is correct—and radar.

General FRANK. And radar? Since the Navy is the only Department that has submarines, and since also in the plan for air reconnaissance at Honolulu they were responsible for distant reconnaissance, it would appear then that it was the responsibility of the Navy to keep both the Army and the Navy in Honolulu advised and to provide protection against any kind of attack so far as reconnaissance could provide that, is that correct?

General MILES. So far as distance reconnaissance is concerned, they alone had the means of carrying it out.

General FRANK. That is all I have.

General GRUNERT. I want you to explain once more so I can get it clear in mind about the dissemination of information gathered by G-2, of the War Department, so I will put it in various questions. You get information from the State Department, ONI, your own sources, and whatever other sources might become available to you. Now, when you get this information, who judges whether or not particular parts of that information [125] are of value and should be transmitted, for instance, to the Commanding General of Hawaii?

General MILES. The first people who pass on it are the members of the section, the Geographical Section, which includes the country about which we have that information—the Japanese, we will say. Information would pass first through the Far Eastern Section, I think it was called at that time, under Colonel Bratton, of the Intelligence Subdivision of the Military Intelligence. ~~That~~ It would then go to the Intelligence Division, itself, which collated all positive intelligence, dealt with all positive intelligence as distinguished from counter-intelligence, the negative side, and would then be sent out.

If it was simply routine, the Chief in the Military Intelligence Division, G-2, would simply see it passing over his desk. If there were any question about it, it would be brought up through normal channels to the executive officer, who, if he did not feel competent to decide it, would take it up with G-2 ~~men and~~ himself. That was the method.

General GRUNERT. If you were disseminating it, then, to the various commands, or any particular command, would it then pass directly from G-2 to such Commander, and in what form?

General MILES. The normal form would be these semiweekly summaries. ~~I mean~~ That would be the routine. ~~Then any~~ Any particular information of particular importance would be telegraphed out to those agencies concerned with that particular bit of information; in the case of Japan, to (certainly) the Philippines, to Hawaii, to Panama, to the West Coast, possibly and so forth right to our military attache ~~at~~ in China and to the G-2 of the ~~foreign departments, or the~~ corps areas.

[126] General GRUNERT. But when you make an estimate of the situation, that then goes to be processed through War Plans Division, to the Chief of Staff?

General MILES. Yes.

General GRUNERT. Now, if there is any information to be passed out on that estimate, it then must be authorized for you to pass it out, or for them to pass it out directly to those concerned, is that right?

General MILES. Yes. It becomes more than information, then; it becomes an opinion of the War Department, a communication of the Chief of Staff.

General GRUNERT. All right. Now, the next question I have is one on which we will have to go back to the sabotage message. Was that sabotage message of November 27 O. K'd by WPD, or the Chief of Staff, or whom? Or was it necessary to have that O. K'd? Did you send it out directly to the G-2?

General MILES. It was not necessary for the Chief of Staff or his office to pass on it, since it simply carried out a policy already established by the previous



messages of the same date from General Marshall. I do remember, however, consulting, as I almost always did, War Plans, as they consulted me on messages, and I think it was General Gerow who suggested that I add to the message that the G-2s were ~~was~~ to inform their Commanding Generals and the Chiefs of Staff only.

General GRUNERT. Did G-2 do its utmost to inform, by contact with the various agencies made available, so as to best advise the Chief of Staff and keep subordinate commands informed, and so that they could carry out their mission?

General MILES. I did not hear the first of your question, [127] relative to the G-2.

General GRUNERT. Did G-2 do its utmost, so far as you could judge, to carry out its mission, in informing the Chief of Staff of everything they had got, making estimates, and passing down information they thought was pertinent?

General MILES. The answer to that is Yes.

General GRUNERT. Naturally. I wanted to put it in the record.

General MILES. I might add, if I may, that we wrote so much that we got certain complaints—complaints that nobody could read all the stuff we turned out. We certainly tried to do whatever we could.

General GRUNERT. Did so many things go out at one time that the "low side" might have considered themselves as being informed to such a point of saturation that they did not pay much attention to the information they were getting? In other words, "crying wolf! wolf!" so that they became confused, or "fed up"?

General MILES. That could have been, sir.

General GRUNERT. Do you think that the G-2 message—we call it "the G-2 message," of November 27—and the sabotage message—we call that the "Arnold message," of the 28th, which was sent out under the Adjutant General's signature—did you consider whether or not they might be taken by the Command "down below" as modifying or changing the Chief of Staff's instructions of November 27?

General MILES. No, sir; I did not. The Chief of Staff's message of November 27 was a war-warning message, in my mind, all inclusive so far as different forms of attack or dangers [128] might be considered, and my message of the same date in regard to sabotage was simply inviting the attention of the G-2, who was particularly charged with that, in each corps area and overseas department, to that particular form of danger.

General GRUNERT. There was no report from the recipients required?

General MILES. There were no report required.

General GRUNERT. That is, to your message.

General MILES. No answer to my message, of the 27th.

General GRUNERT. No answer? But there was a report required by the Chief of Staff's message of November 27?

General MILES. That is true, sir.

General GRUNERT. The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department made his report to the Chief of Staff, presumably on the Chief of Staff's message of November 27. Therein, he reported just the measures taken as to sabotage. Did you see that report?

General MILES. I did not see that message—that answer—until after Pearl Harbor.

General GRUNERT. I do not think of anything else. Does anybody else think of anything else?

General FRANK. When General Grunert just asked you about the possibility of confusing those messages on sabotage, you replied from the point of view of the man at this end. Now, consider yourself for a moment as the man at the receiving end of those messages, not knowing who prepared them, nor anything about their source, but from the point of view of their coming from the War Department, and considering that as a single source: under those conditions, might it or might it not have been a [129] little confusing?

General MILES. It might have been, but I think the first message was signed "Marshall."

General FRANK. That is right.

General MILES. That would be my answer.

General FRANK. Now, the next question is: I asked you, in my questions a few minutes ago, as to whether or not you had sent any message to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department with respect to the presence in the Marshall Islands of this Japanese force. We have, we think, all the communications that went from the War Department to the Hawaiian Department,

from the 16th of November until December 7. This Japanese force was not in the vicinity of Jaluit until about the 25th. In view of the critical stage of the situation, it would seem that that information was rather vital, as there is no record of its having been communicated. Is there any explanation of that?

General MILES. I wouldn't know what the explanation was, if it wasn't communicated. If we had known at the time, as we probably did, that that information, coming from Navy, was being transmitted to the Fleet in Hawaii, to all of their naval vessels, it might very well have been that we considered that as sufficient, knowing that the two Intelligence branches, Army and Navy, were working in very close cooperation, we thought, everywhere—in Hawaii and the West Coast and in the Philippines, and so forth.

I am a little worried about that message, because I was told, this morning, by Military Intelligence, that there are numbered gaps in their files today, and they do not know where [130] those messages are. We hope you have them, but they do not know.

General RUSSELL. We didn't get them from G-2.

General MILES. How?

General RUSSELL. We haven't gotten anything from G-2.

General FRANK. In the Roberts Commission interrogation of Colonel Fielder, who was G-2 in the Hawaiian Department—

General MILES. Yes, G-2.

General FRANK. He discloses that he was not, prior to December 7, getting this information from the Navy, in Honolulu. He was not getting it.

General MILES. He should have, of course.

General FRANK. That is all.

General GRUNERT. One final question. In your experience as Staff Officer and as a Commander in the field, outside the War Department, would a message signed by Marshall carry more weight with you than one signed by the Adjutant General, or one signed by a Staff Officer?

General MILES. Very much more weight, General, particularly when it begins with some such phrase as "This is a war-warning message."

General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions?

General RUSSELL. What message did he ever send, beginning that way, General Miles?

General MILES. My impressions of the message of November 27, but I haven't it before me.

General GRUNERT. There was one starting out that way, but it happened to be a Navy message. This particular message from the Chief of Staff did not start out that way, [131] according to the record.

General RUSSELL. Who was Creswell?

General MILES. Creswell? He was Military Attache in Japan.

General RUSSELL. I want to go back to my Mandated Islands for a minute, General, because you have excited me a little bit. I want to get some description of those islands. Referring to the Marshall Islands, where these carriers are supposed to have assembled, that attacked, is there anybody on those islands except Japanese?

General MILES. Some natives there, I believe—a few, there.

General RUSSELL. Are there towns and roads and those sorts of things there?

General MILES. The only so-called "civilized people" are the Japanese, there, and the others are natives of the Islands. They don't live in towns, very much, I imagine. My information about the Mandated Islands is very slim, now, particularly now—

General RUSSELL. There is no secret at all about the questions that I am asking, and what I am attempting to develop for my own satisfaction, in arriving at what happened at Pearl Harbor. They had everything on us, yet they sailed up and attacked us, and apparently today G-2 doesn't know where they came from, or how many there were, or where they went to. We have not been able so far to get any very intelligent information on what these convoys were like, if there were more than one. Do you have any ideas about that, the size of the attacking forces?

General MILES. Prior to the attack?

General RUSSELL. No, since the attack. Have you gotten [132] information that led you to know how strong these convoys were that came in there, launching this attack?



General MILES. We have only general information, largely from Naval Intelligence. The ships supposed to be the KAGA and AKAGI, those two very large carriers of theirs, supported by probably some of their older battleships of the KONGO class—their four old battle cruisers; but I have no definite information. General RUSSELL. I think that is all.

General GRUNERT. Thank you, very much.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Whereupon, at 12:45 p. m., the Board recessed until 2 p. m.)

EXHIBIT No. 5

CONFIDENTIAL

[Finest Copy Action Copy Radiogram]

FHB/bjs-1712

SEPTEMBER 20, 1941.

AG 3834 (9-20-41) MC  
From: Ft. Shafter, T. H.  
To: The Adjutant General.

No. 420, September 20th.

For G-2, Bureau 114 (encls September Nineteen Forty One Re Natal agents aboard army transports. Investigation revealed that subject, Wilhelm Hirschfeld was not a member of the crew of USAT President Coolidge nor was Joseph Ryan aboard USAT President Cleveland.

SECRET.

[Radiogram]

SEPT. 23, 1941.

701 a. m.

705 WTJ

DIJ

FLO 1255P 22nd

From: Ft. Shafter T. H.

To: G Two

No. 379 September 22nd.

Request authority to reproduce and distribute to certain G two and S two offices in this department confidential document subject protection electric utility property issued by the Federal Power Commission Washington January twentieth nineteen forty one received as inclosure to your letter G two dash ten three thirteen dash one six three March twentieth. Fielder

SECRET.

CL/GC  
OWG

M11 25005 Safeguards

SEPTEMBER 23, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

Subject: Security of information pertaining to movements of ships and aircraft.

The Secretary of War Directs:

1. That a Confidential radiogram substantially as follows be sent to the Commanding Generals of all Departments and Defense Commands:

Effective immediately all radio or cable traffic pertaining to movement of vessels and aircraft to or from the overseas home command department or defense commands will be classified as confidential.

2. That notification to this effect, for information and compliance, be given general distribution, including General Headquarters, the Chief of the Army Air Force, and the commanding officers of existing bases.

SIRHAN MILES.

Memorandum for record: Certain overseas bases have made inquiries by radio of cable messages sent in the clear about personnel, material and docking time of transports, and the Navy has protested this.